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1 INTRODUCTION 
 Off-Chain transactions allow for the immediate transfer of Cryptocurrency between two 
parties, without delays or unavoidable transaction fees. Such capabilities are critical for 
mainstream Cryptocurrency adaption. They allow for the “Coffee-Coin Criteria”; under which a 
customer orders a coffee and pays for that coffee in bitcoins. This is not possible with On-Chain 
transactions today. No customer is willing to wait for 20 minutes for their coffee transaction to 
receive six public confirmations. Neither will the customer pay a 20 cent transaction fee when 
the coffee costs approximately $2. Only a quick and free Off-Chain transaction will satisfy our 
coffee-guzzling consumer. Otherwise, the customer will stick to credit cards and cash,  and 
Bitcoin will face a limited future with regards to everyday use.   
 Unfortunately, all existing Off-Chain transaction protocols are notoriously unreliable 
[https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Off-Chain_Transactions#Trusted_Third_Parties]. The current 
generation of third-party facilitators are vulnerable to hacker-based attacks. As Mt. Gox 
tragically demonstrated, centralized-transaction institutions are easy targets for Cryptocurrency 
thieves. The slightest security flaw in a third-party system will pounced on by hackers, who will 
proceed to devour it like ants devouring a crab. Furthermore, the possible issue of fraud is 
constantly paramount;  third-party facilitators offer little proof that they actually hold the 
bitcoins of their clients [https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Off-Chain_Transactions#Auditing]. Under 
such circumstances, it no wonder that the Public treats most Cryptocurrency services with a 
constant shadow of suspicion. 
 Fortunately for users, trusted third-parties do exist; Coinbase is one such company. 
Coinbase takes a series of concrete and careful steps to circumvent the weak points in its 
protocol. These steps include employee background checks, decentralized cold storage in bank 
vaults scattered across the globe, and a team of security experts on-hand to mitigate against 
cyber-attack [https://coinbase.com/security]. With a multi-million dollar effort, Coinbase was 
able to construct a massive stronghold in order to defend its vulnerable interior from the 
barbaric hacker hordes. Given these resources, Coinbase is well on its way to becoming the 
“Gmail” of the Cryptocurrency community [http://www.coindesk.com/coinbase-gmail-bitcoin/]. 
 The onset of Coinbase has brought benefits to amateur Bitcoin users. Entrepreneurial 
developers on the other hand, have not fared nearly as well.  Many organizations lack the 
financial resources required to run secure Off-Chain transactions.  An entrepreneur struggling 
to design his own Bitcoin coffee-purchasing app will be unable to safely do so on his own. He 
must rely on the Coinbase transfer API, with all its licensed restrictions and limitations 
[https://coinbase.com/legal/user_agreement]. This centralized reliance on a single third-party 
provider severely reduces the freedoms of the Bitcoin developer community. Furthermore, 
such vast centralization poses a singular threat to the Bitcoin paradigm as a whole. Suppose a 
hacker finds a crack in Coinbase-armor; all Off-Chain accounts will then be compromised! That 
hack would undermine all Coinbase-dependent tools and apps, thereby obliterating the trust of 
the casual Cryptocurrency enthusiast. 
 For Bitcoin to flourish, its anti-hierarchy principles must be applied to safe Off-Chain 
transactions. First and foremost, we need a new HACKER-PROOF protocol that can easily be 
executed by any experienced developer. Preferably, the protocol will be open-sourced for full 
reliability and transparency. The developer community must come to the consensus that the 
protocol itself remains unbreakable.  
 In this paper we present one such solution; the CryptoCubic (CC) Protocol. The CC 
Protocol employs MultiSig technology to safely transfer ownership of actual bitcoin addresses 
between individual users. In the following documentation we will describe in iterative detail the 
science behind our CryptoCubic technique, as well as all its individual steps. We will also discuss 
all possible theft-driven attacks against our system, and the how protocol intrinsically defends 
itself against such BlackHat exploitations. It is our aim to meticulously show how the 
CryptoCubic Protocol is hacker-proof in all significant ways.    
2 DEFINING A HACKER-PROOF PROTOCOL 
How does one rigorously demonstrate that a protocol is actually hacker-poof? Any 
non-trivial system may potentially be manipulated in a seemingly infinite number of 
permutations. Therefore, in order to confidently claim that a protocol is safe, one must first 
define the settings under which that safety is guaranteed. One must lay down the rules of the 
game, so to speak, in order to then demonstrate that these rules are inherently unbreakable.  
We begin to define the rules through a series of simple assumptions. First and foremost, 
we assume that the server is benign, and not malicious. The server does not purposefully 
attempt to cheat or manipulate its users. Second of all, we assume that the server executes the 
protocol exactly as specified; no unauthorized alterations or modifications are allowed. 
Furthermore, we assume the presence of a security apparatus capable of immediately 
detecting any deviations from the protocol. That is, if a malicious agent gains server access and 
modifies the code, then protocol execution will immediately terminate until the intrusion is 
resolved. Finally, we assume any calculated variables occurring within an running program are 
wholly inaccessible outside the boundary of that program. For example, if an on-server program 
dynamical computes some secret variable X, then that variable shall remain hidden from the 
world until it is specifically outputted to a memory-location on the server. 
Additionally, let us consider one other significant supposition. We conjecture it is 
possible to design a simple so-called “self-destructive” storage mechanism that is 100% secure. 
What is a self-destructive storage mechanism? Imagine a database table whose content is 
limited to a certain pre-specified Source X. Output requests to the rows in that table may come 
from multiple unspecified sources. We may ping a particular row from the table to check if its 
empty or not. However, accessing the data in that row leads to the data’s immediate deletion. 
Afterwards, the data may not be replaced without the deliberate permission of Source X. Let us 
consider an actual example; X produces Y, and stores Y in a self-destructive database. That 
action is represented as  X-- [Y]. We ping the database to determine that Y is indeed present, 
though we do not know its contents. Next, we input a retrieval request for Y in order to obtain 
its true identity . Y is immediately retrieved, and is automatically deleted from the database. 
We may try to manipulate the system in order to subtly put  Y back its original location, but we 
will not succeed without the direct permission of  resource X. That, in a nutshell, is the function 
of a self-destructive database. Though its maximal level of proven security remains to be 
determined, we venture to conjecture that a totally secure self-destructive mechanism is 
mathematically possible.   
Based on the above-stated assumptions, the server acts as a trusted third-party to its 
users. The server is also a potential target for malicious hackers and thieves. In fact, we shall 
directly associate hacking with theft. Hackers will willfully attack the server for the purpose of 
financial gain. Under such conditions, wanton and profit-less destruction  is not considering 
hacking. Deletion of a server's contents is not a hack. Neither is smashing that server with a 
sledgehammer. We define such destructive activities as acts of vandalism. Defending against 
vandalism requires a secure system of storage and backup, which will not be discussed in this 
paper. We will focus instead on for-profit attacks. Our concern is the thief breaking into the 
vault, not the arsonist trying to burn down the bank. 
Thus we define a hacking attack as a deliberate attempt  to manipulate the protocol for 
the purpose of illicit financial gain. A successful hack entails that an attacker illicitly obtains all 
necessary crypo-keys needed to execute an On-Chain Bitcoin transaction. These keys may be 
obtained in a variety of ways; ranging from the direct replication of server-stored data to the 
more subtle counterfeit emulation of protocol-specific signals. A hacker-proof protocol must 
successfully defend against all these myriad attacks. We shall hence develop one such protocol 
in the subsequent sections of our paper. 
3  MULTISIG OFF-CHAIN TRANSACTIONS 
 In a standard Bitcoin transaction, a single private key is required to transfer funds from 
User_A to User_B. Whoever holds that key controls the funds, therby making it a dangerous 
single-point target for digital attacks. The onset of Bitcoin-based MultiSig cryptography greatly 
helps alleviate that threat. Let us a consider simple 2-of-2 MultiSig system. Two unique private 
keys, Sig_U and Sig_S, are associated with a single public address ADD. Both keys are required 
to control the funds within that address. Illicitly obtaining one but not the other private key is 
not enough to instigate the hack. 
 Suppose that we instigate a new relationship between User_A and Server_S. The Server 
then creates a 2-of-2 MultiSig key-pair associated with an address ADD. The key-pair and the 
address exist within a dynamic running process. They have not yet been stored in server 
memory, and are not accessible to predatory hackers, based on our predefined criteria. We 
represent this transitory state using notation <Sig_U,Sig_S,ADD>. At this point in our execution, 
the memory states of User_A and Server_S exist as follows: 
USER_A SERVER_S 
 <Sig_U,Sig_S,ADD> 
  
Next, Server_S establishes a secure connection with User_A. Sig_U and ADD are transferred 
over to User_A, to be stored in his protocol client’s memory. 
USER_A SERVER_S 
Sig_U <Sig_U,Sig_S,ADD> 
ADD  
 
Afterwards, Sig_S is transferred to the memory of the Server. Given the sensitive nature of 
Sig_S, we choose to treat its storage very careful. As a result, we load Sig_S into a 
self-destructive database; of the sort that is discussed in Section 2. That transfer is represented 
as <Sig_U,Sig_S,ADD> -- [Sig_S], where  <Sig_U,Sig_S,ADD> is a permited self-destructive 
database input source. 
USER_A SERVER_S 
Sig_U <Sig_U,Sig_S,ADD> -- [Sig_S] 
ADD  
 
Finally, the dynamic procedure containing the variables <Sig_U,Sig_S,ADD> reaches 
termination. The temporary variables cease to exist in any form within the Server. Server_S is 
left completely unaware of the contents of private key Sig_U. 
 USER_A SERVER_S 
Sig_U [Sig_S] 
ADD  
 
At this point, User_A executes an On-Chain Bitcoin transaction from an exterior wallet, thereby 
transferring $10 to address ADD. 
USER_A SERVER_S 
Sig_U [Sig_S] 
ADD ($10)  
 
Now User_A encounters User_B, who has no connection to the Server. 
USER_A SERVER_S USER_B 
Sig_U [Sig_S]  
ADD ($10)   
 
User_A and User_B initialize a data-exchange transaction, where User_B receives both ADD 
($10) and  Sig_U from User_A. 
USER_A SERVER_S USER_B 
Sig_U [Sig_S] Sig_U 
ADD ($10)  ADD ($10) 
 
At this juncture, User_B has multiple options. He can transfer Sig_U back to User_A. He can 
transfer Sig_U to some other User_C. Finally, he can request Sig_S directly from the Server, 
resulting in its immediate deletion from the self-destructive database. 
USER_A SERVER_S USER_B 
Sig_U  Sig_U 
ADD ($10)  Sig_S 
  ADD ($10) 
 
Once User_B obtains Sig_S, he will gain instantaneous control of the $10 in address ADD. What 
we have just described is MultiSig Off-Chain transaction. Of course, the aforementioned 
transaction is exceedingly insecure. There are many reasons for this, but the foremost cause of 
insecurity is the unreliability of User_A. What if User_A grabs Sig_S from Server_S after the 
transaction is completed? What if User_A posted the value of Sig_U on some shady Darknet 
hacker forum? What if User_A is just one of many previous Off-Chain Sig_U recipients, any of 
which could have comprised its contents? User_B remains consistently aware that one or more 
Sig_U-possessing individuals could in theory hack the Server, thereby stealing all his funds. This 
is unacceptable; we must employ cryptography to make our MultiSig transactions more secure. 
4  ENCRYPTED MULTISIG OFF-CHAIN TRANSACTIONS 
 Let us consider the following MultiSig encrypted schema; Server_S interacts with 
User_A. User_A immediately produces an asymmetrical public/private pair of keys; 
(Ka,Ka_Public). Ka_Public can encrypt a string that may only be decrypted using Ka.  
USER_A SERVER_S 
Ka  
Ka_Public  
 
User_A transfers the public key to Server_S. The Server then creates a symmetric key Ks, which 
can be used to both encrypt and decrypt data. 
USER_A SERVER_S 
Ka Ks 
Ka_Public Ka_Public 
 
Server_S proceeds to input both keys into a dynamic procedure that is not accessible from 
memory. 
USER_A SERVER_S 
Ka <Ks,Ka_Public> 
Ka_Public Ks 
 Ka_Public 
 
The dynamic procedure generates three MultiSig components; Sig_U, Sig_S, and ADD. 
USER_A SERVER_S 
Ka <Ks,Ka_Public,Sig_U,Sig_S,ADD> 
Ka_Public Ks 
 Ka_Public 
 
The dynamic procedure encrypts Sig_U using Ka_Public, in order to create cypher Ea. In 
addition, the procedure encrypts Sig_S using Ks, in order to produce cypher Es. 
USER_A SERVER_S 
Ka <Ks,Ka_Public,Sig_U,Sig_S,ADD,Ea,Es> 
Ka_Public Ks 
 Ka_Public 
 
The running procedure on Server_S securely transfers Es and ADD to User_A. 
USER_A SERVER_S 
Ka <Ks,Ka_Public,Sig_U,Sig_S,ADD,Ea,Es> 
Es Ks 
ADD Ka_Public 
Ka_Public  
 
The running procedure on Server_S transfers Ea into a self-destructive database 
USER_A SERVER_S 
Ka <Ks,Ka_Public,Sig_U,Sig_S,ADD,Ea,Es> -- [Ea] 
Es Ks 
ADD Ka_Public 
Ka_Public  
 
The running procedure finally terminates, thereby destroying all its inaccessible contents. 
USER_A SERVER_S 
Ka [Ea] 
Es Ks 
ADD Ka_Public 
Ka_Public  
 
The combined data contents of User_A and Server_S form a “CryptoSquare”, which is 
highlighted in following table. 
USER_A SERVER_S 
Ka [Ea] 
Es Ks 
ADD Ka_Public 
Ka_Public  
 The CryptoSquare ensures that neither User_A nor Server_S are able to obtain either of the 
unecrypted signature-keys (Sig_U,Sig_S) without mutual collaboration. User_A retains no 
knowledge of these variables. In order to make transfers from address ADD, User_A needs to 
request both cypher Ea and key Ks from Server_S, which will result in the immediate deletion of 
[Ea] within the server’s self-destructive database. 
 The significance of the CryptoSquare first becomes apparent when User_A encounters 
User_B, after adding funds to address ADD. 
USER_A SERVER_S USER_B 
Ka [Ea]  
Es Ks  
ADD ($10) Ka_Public  
Ka_Public   
 
User_A initiates an encrypted Off-Chain transaction by transferring Es and ADD ($10) to User_B 
USER_A SERVER_S USER_B 
Ka [Ea] Es 
Es Ks ADD ($10) 
ADD ($10) Ka_Public  
Ka_Public   
 
User_B responds by creating the asymmetric key-pair (Kb, Kb_Public). 
USER_A SERVER_S USER_B 
Ka [Ea] Kb 
Es Ks Es 
ADD ($10) Ka_Public Kb_Public 
Ka_Public  ADD ($10) 
 
User_B transfers Kb_Public to Server_S. 
USER_A SERVER_S USER_B 
Ka [Ea] Kb 
Es Ks Es 
ADD ($10) Kb_Public Kb_Public 
Ka_Public Ka_Public ADD ($10) 
 
The Server requests and receives permission from User_A to initiate the transaction. 
Afterwards, the server initializes a dynamic procedure that accesses Ea from the 
self-destructive database. Cypher Ea is eliminated from memory; it now exists solely within the 
inaccessible dynamic procedure. 
USER_A SERVER_S USER_B 
Ka <Ea> Kb 
Es Ks Es 
ADD ($10) Kb_Public ADD ($10) 
Ka_Public Ka_Public Kb_Public 
 
Server_S requests a copy of key Ka from User_A. It then confirms the key Ka is a proper match 
for Ka_Public. If Ka is not received, or a proper confirmation is not made, then Ea will once 
again be placed into a self-destructive database, and the transaction will be determined. 
Otherwise, the transaction will continue. 
USER_A SERVER_S USER_B 
Ka <Ea> Kb 
Es Ks Es 
ADD ($10) Kb_Public ADD ($10) 
Ka_Public Ka Kb_Public 
 Ka_Public  
 
The dynamic procedure on Server_S loads the value of Ka from server memory.  
USER_A SERVER_S USER_B 
Ka <Ea,Ka> Kb 
Es Ks Es 
ADD ($10) Kb_Public ADD ($10) 
Ka_Public Ka Kb_Public 
 Ka_Public  
 
The dynamic procedure on Server_S decrypts Sig_U from Ea using Ka. 
USER_A SERVER_S USER_B 
Ka <Ea,Ka,Sig_U> Kb 
Es Ks Es 
ADD ($10) Kb_Public ADD ($10) 
Ka_Public Ka Kb_Public 
 Ka_Public  
 The dynamic procedure on Server_S loads the value of Kb_Public from server memory.  
USER_A SERVER_S USER_B 
Ka <Ea,Ka,Sig_U,Kb_Public> Kb 
Es Ks Es 
ADD ($10) Kb_Public ADD ($10) 
Ka_Public Ka Kb_Public 
 Ka_Public  
 
The dynamic procedure on Server_S encrypts Eb from Sig_U using Kb_Public. 
USER_A SERVER_S USER_B 
Ka <Ea,Ka,Sig_U,Kb_Public,Eb> Kb 
Es Ks Es 
ADD ($10) Kb_Public ADD ($10) 
Ka_Public Ka Kb_Public 
 Ka_Public  
 
The dynamic procedure on Server_S stores Eb within a self-destructive database. 
USER_A SERVER_S USER_B 
Ka <Ea,Ka,Sig_U,Kb_Public,Eb> -- 
[Eb] 
Kb 
Es Ks Es 
ADD ($10) Kb_Public ADD ($10) 
Ka_Public Ka Kb_Public 
 Ka_Public  
 
The dynamic procedure is finally terminated. User_A and User_B are both notified that the 
transaction has been successfully fully completed. 
USER_A SERVER_S USER_B 
Ka [Eb] Kb 
Es Ks Es 
ADD ($10) Kb_Public ADD ($10) 
Ka_Public Ka Kb_Public 
 Ka_Public  
 
The final result of the transaction is a newly-generated CryptoSquare for User_B.  
USER_A SERVER_S USER_B 
Ka [Eb] Kb 
Es Ks Es 
ADD ($10) Kb_Public ADD ($10) 
Ka_Public Ka Kb_Public 
 Ka_Public  
 
 User_B, in tandem with the Server, now controls the resources associated with address ADD. 
Furthermore, User_B, as well as User_A and Server_S, all remain completely unaware of the 
ADD-associated signatures. Finally, User_A lacks the means to obtain both signature keys 
without direct  permission from User_B. 
 It appears that CryptoSquare-based transformations allow us to efficiently transfer 
funds between two users without relying on the BlockChain. We may geometrically display 
these transformations by visualizing the movements of cryptographic variables across the eight 
corners of a cube. The two transforming CryptoSquares for Users A and B are present on two 
faces of this three-dimensional “CryptoCube.” Thusly, we shall refer to all 
CyptoSquare-dependent Off-Chain transactions as “CryptoCubic Transactions.” These 
CryptoCubic transactions form the core of our CryptoCubic Protocol. 
5 AUTHENTICATION IN THE CRYPTOCUBIC PROTOCAL 
 The following additions to our CryptoCubic Protocol will guarantee direct authentication 
Between User_A, Server_S, and User_B. Let us consider the early stage of the initial relationship 
between User_A and Server_S, when the two MutiSig signatures are first generated. 
USER_A SERVER_S 
Ka <Ks,Ka_Public,Sig_U,Sig_S,ADD> 
Ka_Public Ks 
 Ka_Public 
 
Server_S stores an SHA-outputted Hash of Sig_S within its memory contents. 
USER_A SERVER_S 
Ka <Ks,Ka_Public,Sig_U,Sig_S,ADD> 
Ka_Public Ks 
 Ka_Public 
  
 Hash 
The Hash remains within the Server’s memory after the CryptoSquare relationship is 
established. 
USER_A SERVER_S 
Ka [Ea] 
Es Ks 
ADD Ka_Public 
Ka_Public  
  
 Hash 
 
Later, User_A and User_B initialize a CryptoCubic transaction. 
USER_A SERVER_S USER_B 
Ka [Ea] Kb 
Es Ks Es 
ADD ($10) Ka_Public Kb_Public 
Ka_Public  ADD ($10) 
   
 Hash  
 
At this point in the transaction, User_B transfers Kb_Public to User_A. 
USER_A SERVER_S USER_B 
Ka [Ea] Kb 
Es Ks Es 
ADD ($10) Ka_Public Kb_Public 
Ka_Public  ADD ($10) 
   
Kb_Public Hash  
 
Afterwards, User_A transfers Kb_Public to Server_S. 
USER_A SERVER_S USER_B 
Ka <Ea> Kb 
Es Ks Es 
ADD ($10) Kb_Public ADD ($10) 
Ka_Public Ka Kb_Public 
 Ka_Public  
   
Kb_Public Hash  
Server_S must now authenticate the true identity of User_A. The Server does so by creating a 
randomized token-string; Token_A. 
USER_A SERVER_S USER_B 
Ka <Ea> Kb 
Es Ks Es 
ADD ($10) Kb_Public ADD ($10) 
Ka_Public Ka Kb_Public 
 Ka_Public  
   
Kb_Public Hash  
 Token_A  
 
The Server encrypts the contents of Token_A with Ka_Public, thereby producing cypher Et_A. 
USER_A SERVER_S USER_B 
Ka <Ea> Kb 
Es Ks Es 
ADD ($10) Kb_Public ADD ($10) 
Ka_Public Ka Kb_Public 
 Ka_Public  
   
Kb_Public Hash  
 Token_A  
 Et_A  
 
Et_A is transferred back to User_A. User_A decrypts it; outputting the variable Token_A2. 
Token_A2 is transferred to the Server. Server_S confirms that Token_A is equivalent to 
Token_A2. User_A authentication is now complete, and the transaction may continue. 
USER_A SERVER_S USER_B 
Ka <Ea> Kb 
Es Ks Es 
ADD ($10) Kb_Public ADD ($10) 
Ka_Public Ka Kb_Public 
 Ka_Public  
   
Kb_Public Hash  
Et_A Token_A  
Token_A2 Et_A  
 Token_A2  
Server_S makes preparations to authenticate the identity of User_B. It does so by creating 
Token_B and the cypher Et_B. 
USER_A SERVER_S USER_B 
Ka <Ea> Kb 
Es Ks Es 
ADD ($10) Kb_Public ADD ($10) 
Ka_Public Ka Kb_Public 
 Ka_Public  
   
Kb_Public Hash  
Et_A Token_A  
Token_A2 Et_A  
 Token_A2  
 Token_B  
 Et_B  
 
Afterwards, the Server receives a contact request from User_B. Server_S establishes the 
identity of User_B using the aforementioned token-exchange schema. 
USER_A SERVER_S USER_B 
Ka <Ea> Kb 
Es Ks Es 
ADD ($10) Kb_Public ADD ($10) 
Ka_Public Ka Kb_Public 
 Ka_Public  
   
Kb_Public Hash  
Et_A Token_A  
Token_A2 Et_A  
 Token_A2  
 Token_B Et_B 
 Et_B Token_B2 
 Token_B2  
 
Server_S proceeds to transfer the value of Hash to User_B. 
USER_A SERVER_S USER_B 
Ka <Ea> Kb 
Es Ks Es 
ADD ($10) Kb_Public ADD ($10) 
Ka_Public Ka Kb_Public 
 Ka_Public  
   
Kb_Public Hash Hash 
Et_A Token_A  
Token_A2 Et_A  
 Token_A2  
 Token_B Et_B 
 Et_B Token_B2 
 Token_B2  
 
User_B executes an SHA-hash on cypher Es, outputting the variable Hash2. 
USER_A SERVER_S USER_B 
Ka <Ea> Kb 
Es Ks Es 
ADD ($10) Kb_Public ADD ($10) 
Ka_Public Ka Kb_Public 
 Ka_Public  
   
Kb_Public Hash Hash 
Et_A Token_A Hash2 
Token_A2 Et_A  
 Token_A2  
 Token_B Et_B 
 Et_B Token_B2 
 Token_B2  
 
User_B authenticates that Hash is identical to Hash2. This confirms that User_A has transferred 
over a non-counterfeit Es. 
  
USER_A SERVER_S USER_B 
Ka <Ea> Kb 
Es Ks Es 
ADD ($10) Kb_Public ADD ($10) 
Ka_Public Ka Kb_Public 
 Ka_Public  
   
Kb_Public Hash Hash 
Et_A Token_A Hash2 
Token_A2 Et_A  
 Token_A2  
 Token_B Et_B 
 Et_B Token_B2 
 Token_B2  
 
Authentication is officially completed. The CryptoCubic transaction proceeds as specified; 
leading to the creation of a CryptoSquare associated with User_B. 
 
USER_A SERVER_S USER_B 
Ka [Eb] Kb 
Es Ks Es 
ADD ($10) Kb_Public ADD ($10) 
Ka_Public Ka Kb_Public 
 Ka_Public  
   
Kb_Public Hash Hash 
Et_A Token_A Hash2 
Token_A2 Et_A  
 Token_A2  
 Token_B Et_B 
 Et_B Token_B2 
 Token_B2  
 
